University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

Fall 2013

Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law
D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida Levin College of Law, sokold@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1 (2013), available
at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/545

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
VOL. 10

Fall 2013

No. 1

MERGER CONTROL UNDER CHINA'S
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
D.

DANIEL SOKOL*

This essay explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under
China'sAnti-Monopoly Law (AML). While there are currently only a small
number of published merger decisions, this paper overcomes that obstacle by
utilizing a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple
jurisdictions. This survey captures transactionscontemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allowsfor broaderinferences to be drawn
about the development of Chinese antitrust law, including: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrialpolicy and other political
factors may impact merger enforcement, and issues of institutionaldesign,
transparency, and delay. The survey has implicationsfor antitrust, institutional design, intellectualproperty rights, and business law more generally.
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I.
INTRODUCTION

Legal developments in China continue to increase in
global importance, particularly in the business realm.' One of
the most important areas of such global impact is in mergers
and acquisitions. If Chinese authorities can block mergers using their antitrust laws, this may scuttle mergers that would
otherwise benefit consumers in the United States or even globally.
China's antitrust merger regime under the AML went into
force in 2008.2 Since the AML's introduction, over 600 mergers have been notified under the AML to China's Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) for antitrust review. Because
MOFCOM has issued only a small number of merger decisions, the literature on Chinese merger control is based on a
potentially unrepresentative sample. 3 This article attempts to
bridge the empirical gap by providing an analysis of a larger
data set of transactions.
This article is the first to overcome the limited number of
decided cases through a unique practitioner survey of antitrust
lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. The survey asked about
1. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin & CurtisJ. Milhaupt, We Are the (National)Champions: Understandingthe Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REv.
697, 699 (2013).
-- ) [Antimonopoly-Monopoly Law of
Ai|
2.
the People's Republic of China] ch. 1, art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. Gaz. 517 (China), availableat http://
www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content 732591.htm, translated in LAWINFO
CHINA.COM, http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6351&
keyword=monopoly (last visited Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter AML].
3. See Pingping Shan et al., China'sAnti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare
Standard?, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 31, 41 (2012); Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao,
Merger Control Policy Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG.
109, 118 (2012).
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the lawyers' personal experiences counseling clients on mergers and joint ventures under the AML. This survey also captured transactions contemplated, but never undertaken, as
well as mergers notified under the AML for which a decision
was rendered, but not published, by MOFCOM. The survey
data reconstructs most, if not nearly all, of the mergers filed
under the AML at the time of the survey.
This article also provides an in-depth analysis of the decision-making process that drives AML merger outcomes. It analyzes, in the Chinese context, the welfare standard used in
merger analysis, the industrial policy and other political factors that may influence enforcement, the issues of institutional
design affecting merger enforcement, and issues of transparency and delay. These issues do not merely influence Chinese antitrust; they revive fundamental questions in U.S. antitrust law about the goals of antitrust 4 and questions of institutional design. 5 In Part II, this paper provides an overview of
the AML and of the existing academic literature on the topic.
Section III provides a description of the survey methodology
used to reach the target survey respondents. Section IV provides a discussion of the survey results, such as the welfare standard used in Chinese antitrust, the multiple facets of industrial
policy considerations in merger control, MOFCOM decisionmaking and capacity constraints, questions of institutional design and the role of transparency, and due process within
merger review. Finally, Section V offers concluding thoughts.
4. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in US.
and E.U Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2497 (2013) [hereinafter
Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards];Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1020 (1987); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966); Herbert Hovenkamp, DistributiveJustice and
the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I (1982); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008); Robert Pitofsky, Past,
Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the FederalTrade Commission, 72 U.
CHI. L. REv. 209, 217 (2005); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act,
14J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1985).
5. DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (2011); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, InstitutionalDesign, Agency Life-cycle and The Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2163, 2167-68 (2013); William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law:
How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (2012).
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II.
OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Merger control is the mostly ex ante control of anti-competitive behavior.6 It requires prediction and speculation as to
the potential effects of a given merger. The two primary
merger effects that concern antitrust are: (1) unilateral effects
that may create monopoly power,'7 and (2) coordinated effects
that may create oligopolistic exercise of market power or direct communication amongst a cartel of surviving firms.8
Merger control has spread around the globe. More than

ninety jurisdictions have some form of a merger control regime.9 Most of these regimes have been established within the
past twenty years. The development of merger control has
been fueled in part by growing globalization and cross border
merger and acquisition activity' 0 and in part due to the spread
more generally of antitrust law." Chinese merger control is
part of this trend.
There is significant literature on the goals of antitrust, focusing on variations of two goals - consumer welfare' 2 and to-

6. See Marco Ottaviani & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Ex Ante orEx Post Competition Policy? A Progress Report, 29 INT'LJ. INIUS. ORG. 356 (2011).
7. Bryan Keating & Robert Willig, Unilateral Effects, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel

Sokol eds., forthcoming 2014).
8. Januz Ordover & Jith Jayaratne, CoordinatedEffects, in OxFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel

Sokol eds., forthcoming 2014).
9. J. MARK GIDLEY & GEORGE L. PAUL, WORLDWIDE MERGER NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (2013).
10. Isil Erel et al., Financing-MotivatedAcquisitions, 67 J. FIN. 1045 (2012).
11. Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical
Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271
(2007).
12. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, A Traditionaland Textualist Analysis of the
Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2349 (2013); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is
the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Lov. CONSUMER L. REv. 336 (2010).
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tal welfare." Most economists suggest that total welfare is the
correct standard.14
Current discussion of welfare goals often assumes that
only antitrust industrial organization (antitrust economics)
based economic goals (total welfare or consumer welfare)
shape enforcement decisions. Scholarly debate has focused on
these antitrust economics factors. Policy goals based upon political factors are not part of current antitrust policy in the
United States. Political factors are also playing a much smaller
role at the European Commission.' 5
There is an established body of scholarship regarding the
political determinants of merger control in the United
States,' 6 Europe,' 7 and Canada.' 8 This work has not been ex13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARAnOx: A PoLICy AT WAR
WITH ITSELF (1978); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and
the Goals ofAntitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 474 (2012)
[hereinafter Blair & Sokol, Rule of Reason].
14. See, e.g., MASSIMO MoTTA, COMPETITION Poicy: THEORY AND PRACTICE
22 (2004) (stating a preference for the welfare standard); RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) (describing a consensus that the "goal
of antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare"); Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need To Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 157 (2007)
(stating that "the proper objective of antitrust should be total surplus, not
consumer surplus"); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION PoL'v INT'l. 3 (2006) (claiming that
some arguments in favor of the consumer welfare standard are weak); Ken

Heyer, Welfare Standardsand Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION
PoY'v INr'L 29 (2006) (arguing for the use of the total welfare standard).
Some work suggests that a consumer welfare standard will help maximize
total welfare. See David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and
Equilibrium Antitrust Policy, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (1993) (finding that expected social welfare is maximized under a standard higher than the social
welfare criterion); Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik R611er, Consumer Surplus
vs. Welfare Standard in a PoliticalEconomy Model of Merger Control, 23 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 829, 847 (2005) (suggesting that a welfare standard may be
more appropriate where the transparency and accountability of an agency's
processes are high); Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus Defense in
Merger Control, in THE POnLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 287, 287 (Vivek
Ghosal &Johan Stennek eds., 2007) (arguing that a welfare standard with a
consumer bias will promote allocative efficiency).
15. Tomaso Duso, A Decade of Ex-post Merger Policy Evaluations: A Progress
Report, in MORE PROS AND CONS OF MERGER CONTROL, 125, 172-78 (Swedish
Competition Authority ed., 2012).

16. See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush: Twenty Years of Merger
Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission, GLOHAL

COMPETITION POL'Y

(2009) (examining empirical data on the effect of politics on merger en-
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tended to the context of Chinese mergers except through case
studies of a handful of merger decisions.' 9 Moreover, while
there has been some empirical work on outbound Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI),20 there has been less research
devoted to inbound investment in China.
In some younger antitrust regimes, political factors have
not migrated outside of antitrust analysis to other parts of government, such as sector regulation or national security regulation. For these younger regimes, merger control may lead to
significant tension domestically across a number of different
institutions. 2 1 Issues such as foreign ownership, job losses, and
the creation of national champions that form the basis of a
forcement) [hereinafter Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush]; Malcolm B. Coate, A
Test ofPolitical Control of the Bureaucracy:The Case of Mergers, 14 EcON. & POL. 1
(2002) (examining further empirical data) [hereinafter Coate, Political Control]; Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama justice Department ReinvigoratedAntitrust
Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012), http://www.stanfordlaw
review.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/65_Stan._L._Rev._Online_13.
pdf (finding evidence that political determinants do not have a strong effect
on merger policies); D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1055, 1073-75 (2010) (outlining how politics
affect several aspects of merger enforcement); Jonathan B. Baker & Carl
Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (finding that
merger enforcement varied by presidential administration).

17. See, e.g., Nihat Aktas et al., Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?,
117 ECON. J. 1096, 1117-18 (2007) [hereinafter Aktas et al., European M&A
Regulation]; Tomaso Duso et al., The PoliticalEconomy of European Merger Control: Evidence Using Stock Market Data, 50 J.L. & ECON. 455 (2007); Nihat Aktas
et al., Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A Reexamination
of the Protectionism Hypothesis (Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Aktas et al.,
Market Reactions) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
I. Serdar Ding &
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1961188&download=yes;

Isil Erel, Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions (May 18, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://fisher.osu.edu/fin/faculty/erel/
papers/Dinc Erel_2012Mayl8.pdf.
18. See, e.g., R.S. Khemani & D.M. Shapiro, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Canadian Merger Policy, 41 J. INDus. ECON. 161 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Lin & Zhao, supra note 3; Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua

Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patternsand Implications, 6J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 477 (2009).
20. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China's Outward Foreign
Direct Investment, 39 J. INT'L BUS. STuD. 337 (2008).
21. See Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China - Scaling the Walls
of Government Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 185-87 (2008).
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country's industrial policy may exacerbate situations in which
politics may play a larger role in antitrust, either implicitly or
explicitly.2 2 China is a case study of how such tensions play out.
The AML establishes fundamental regulations for the
country's market practices and sets restrictions on various business practices. To a certain extent, the AML constitutes a tremendous leap forward for China, providing it a crucial role in
the world economy and changing its global antitrust profile.
For example, a delay or opposition to a merger by MOFCOM
can hold up a deal and lead to its collapse, much the way that
a similar hold-up on the part of U.S. or European antitrust
authorities can for a global deal. 23
Although China's AML is based substantially on the established body of E.U. and U.S. antitrust law, it is not a complete
transplant of these systems. Rather, the AML's provisions reveal interesting ambiguities and uncertainties regarding some
basic antitrust issues. These provisions also reflect Chinese political and economic concerns.24
Article 27 of the AML covers merger control. Under Article 27, there is a somewhat contradictory list of the various factors that MOFCOM can utilize in considering whether or not
to approve a merger. These include: (1) market share, power,
and concentration; (2) the effect of market concentration on
entry and technological innovation; (3) effects on consumers
and other related undertakings; (4) effect on the development
of the national economy; (5) and other factors as determined
by the State Council Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority.
Thus, the fourth and possibly fifth factors allow MOFCOM to
impose conditions that might not be based on traditional antitrust economics factors.
22. See Lawrence J. White, Antitrust Policy and IndustrialPolicy: A View from
the U.S. 6-7 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
08-05, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1091244.
23. For more on the problems of global hold-up due to mergers, see D.
Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L.
Riv. 1029, 1042-48 (2011); D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The
Institutional Challenge of InternationalAntitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELy Bus. L.J. 37 (2007).

24. Changqi Wu & Zhicheng Liu, A Tiger Without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG.

133 (2012).
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To be sure, China's is not the only antitrust system that
explicitly articulates non-economic goals. 2 5 Yet, unlike other
major jurisdictions with multiple goals in both statute and case
law, China's merger control in practice is a system in which
these political factors may be used extensively. The Chinese
experience provides insights into other emerging antitrust regimes that grapple with potential clashes of larger political
economy goals with industrial organization, as well as capacity
constraints on the part of the antitrust system.
Based on the relative youth of China's merger control system, there have been only sixteen published merger decisions
to date (twelve at the time of the survey). Similarly, there have
been few overall decided conduct cases in China. Shan et al.
caution:
Thus, since MOFCOM has challenged only a few proposed mergers, we have sparse data from which to infer its interpretation of the AML's welfare standard.
In addition, MOFCOM has not issued decisions for
mergers that were approved unconditionally, and so
we have no record of the welfare calculus performed
in the majority of cases. Moreover, legal policy of how
the merger regime works in practice is not clear as
there have been few decisions. 26
Without a better understanding of the realities of merger
control, it is difficult to make well-grounded theoretical or empirical arguments about how merger control works. Such an
understanding is essential to determining how merger control
should be modified to be made more effective, as Tomaso
Duso suggests, with regard to three dimensions: predictability,
correctness, and deterrence. 27
The current study aims to move beyond some of the traditional data limitations of published decisions to develop a
25. See ADVOCACY WORKINc GPi., INT'L COMPETITION NETwORK, ADvoCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY 32 (2002), available at http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf
("[O]bjectives of competition laws vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. . . . [P]arallel objectives, possibly conflicting with that of economic
efficiency or consumer welfare, are present in many competition laws.").
26. Shan et al., supra note 3, at 41.
27. Duso, supra note 15, at 3. Other factors may be possible. However,
Duso makes a compelling case why these three should be the ones that drive
merger control.
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more informed view of Chinese merger control and the extent
to which politics trumps economics (either total or consumer
welfare). By doing so, it undertakes a more nuanced analysis
of the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese merger system.
This essay uses a qualitative practitioner survey to provide
greater texture and nuance to our understanding of the Chinese merger control system.
III.
SURVEY METHODS

Between March and April 2012, the survey targeted lawyers across Chambers-ranked international law firms from Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Europe, and the United States to
discuss their outbound proposed, actual, and anticipated antitrust merger counseling with regard to deals with AML implications. The survey approached a total of ninety-eight Chambers-ranked law firms, and received responses from lawyers at
eighty-seven of those firms.2 8 We did not interview People's
Republic of China (PRC) law firms; despite the experience
and insight these practitioners have with regards to their home
jurisdiction, we did not interview them for this survey because
they lacked a comparative analysis of the merger deals in question. Moreover, PRC firm interviews created concerns that
confidential information conveyed, given such a small practitioner community in China, might be traced back to particular
firms and individuals.
This survey involved interviews with "elite" law firms2 9 because elite practitioners are more likely to have client matters
that represent the more difficult cases decided "at the margins," more likely to have significant deal flow in terms of total
number of deal observations, and they are more likely to deal
with cutting-edge issues in merger analysis and agency responses to novel theories. Such firms also have a larger case
flow of "simple" transactions because of their expertise as repeat players.so
28. For rankings and methodologies, see CHAMBERS AND PARTNERS, http:/
/www.chambersandpartners.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
29. Elite firms are those that are globally ranked as highly skilled in antitrust according to Chambers and Partners.
30. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 95 (1974).
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The use of qualitative research has certain benefits. 3 1 The
most important purpose of this essay's research is to gain valuable, in-depth insight into a topic that has not yet been studied
in the emerging and changing antitrust merger field.
When using qualitative research methods, the researcher's role is to collect facts on both the objective experiences as well as the subjective meaning that the activities have
for the individuals. 3 2
The main reason for the lack of large and quantitative
empirical merger work in China is the lack of transparency in
the Chinese legal and administrative regimes. Because the
contours of the full data set are unclear, it is not certain that
the sample is random. Hence, there is the persistent danger of
sample selection bias, making it difficult to establish robust
empirical proof of domestic bias. Given the lack of decided
merger decisions (and their possible inappropriateness of a
form measurement),3 this study aimed to develop a more informed view of Chinese merger control and the extent to
which politics trumps economic based welfare standards and
the modalities of both procedural and substantive antitrust
merger control realities. This allowed for an in depth understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese
merger system, and for distinctions to be drawn among the
various perceptions of myth and reality of Chinese antitrust
merger control.
Participants were recruited using snowball sampling (also
referred to as chain referral sampling).34 The snowball sam-

pling technique begins with a small sample of individuals who
have agreed to participate in the study. From this sample, each
individual identified k (some given number) of individuals
they knew to also participate. Snowball sampling is best used
31. See generally Guy G. Gable, Integrating Case Study and Survey Research
Methods: An Example in Infomation Systems, 3 EUR. J. INFO. SYST. 112 (1994).
32. Id.
33. On measurement issues, see Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-AgentAnalyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership, andjob Design,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24 (1991).
34. Snowball sampling has been used in antitrust. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T
CRIMINAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT:
ACCOUNTABILIY OFFICE, GAO-11-619,
STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON IMPACT OF 2004 ANTITRUST REFORM ARE MIXED, BUT
SUPPORT WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION (2011), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/dl 1619.pdf.
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when participants are in close proximity to one another, as the
lawyers working together in antitrust firms were for our
study.35
The use of snowball sampling is incredibly beneficial in
research, and works especially well when researchers are attempting to sample units that naturally interact with one another.3 6 Snowball sampling's strength is its ability to sample a
population that is difficult to reach. Typically, this sampling
technique is used to reach deviant populations, such as substance users; however, for the purpose of this research we used
the technique to gain information from a unique population
that is not deviant (lawyer jokes aside).
For the purposes of this study, a sample of lawyers was
asked to identify k lawyers whom they know at other firms that
have been involved in China-related merger work. Goodman
suggests this method is best used when we begin with a true
random sample of the target population at the outset.3 7 However, this is difficult when the researcher has a hidden population. The current study accessed lawyers listed via Chambersranked antitrust firms. From this list, we sent emails to all law
firms with listed lawyers in order to get a large enough sample
of voluntary participants. Some research says one cannot truly
make statistical inferences with snowball sampling because of a
volunteerism bias, but nearly all law firms responded to the
survey and so this reduced volunteerism bias.38
In this study, the target sample was difficult to reach because of job workload. Lawyers in this field also may have a
potential negative bias against research and may not want to
get involved in a research study. Therefore, establishing rapport with the individuals involved was essential for the research. Once we discussed that confidentiality was to be maintained (particularly important for China related research),
35. Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid
PopulationEstimatesfrom Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden Populations,49 Soc.
PROBS.

11, 12 (2002).

36. See Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: Problems and
Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling, 10 Soc. METHODS & RE-s. 141 (1981).
37. See Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL

STAT. 148, 149 (1961) (describing snowball sampling).
38. See Sven Berg, Snowball Sampling-I, in Encyclopedia of Statistical Sci-

ences (Samuel Kotz, Campbell Read, N. Balakrishnan & Brani Vidakovic eds.)
(2006).
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lawyers were more willing to voluntarily participate.3 9 We conducted phone interviews with each test subject. Each of the
interviews included closed-ended questions regarding employment background. Thereafter, the qualitative interviews utilized open-ended questions with similar questions across interviewees to understand the dynamics of Chinese merger control.

IV.
DISCUSSION

The survey evidence allows for insights on a number of
topics. Overall, the view of practitioners is that the Chinese
system differs from both U.S. and European merger control
regimes. Table 1 below is a graphical illustration of the comparison of U.S., European and Chinese merger control systems
and is derived from the practitioner interviews. It compares
the welfare standard used by the antitrust agencies, the
amount of overt political factors that are determinants of
merger enforcement, the role of industrial policy, questions of
institutional design and other parts of government activity
within merger approval as well as transparency and delay
within merger control.
Of the three Chinese agencies that enforce the AML
(MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC), practitioners view MOFCOM
as the most outward looking and transparent, largely because
MOFCOM also holds China's trade portfolio. As a result of this
outward orientation, practitioners noticed that over the past
five years MOFCOM has worked hard to put together a good
technical team to staff merger review, has tried to comply with
international best practice, and has become far more transparent in signaling its policy to outsiders. 4 0
Whereas practitioners initially felt that MOFCOM was reluctant to listen to stakeholders and far more defensive about
its decision-making, the mood among respondents is that
39. It is important to note that snowball sampling is a non-probability
technique that does not ensure that every participant in the target population has an equal chance of being in the sample. See Heckathorn, supra note
35. However, this was not necessary for the current study. We sought rich
information from those willing to share it and this was best done through
the snowball sampling procedure.
40. Practitioner interview responses.
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DIFFERENCES IN MERGER CONTROL ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES, EUROPE AND CHINA
United States

Europe

China

Consumer
welfare

Consumer
welfare

Mix between
consumer and
total welfare

Political factors within
merger control

No

Only in the form of
competitor complaints

Yes

Industrial policy

No

No (although yes at the
National Competition
Authority level)

Yes

Other parts of
government active in
antitrust merger analysis

No

No

Yes

Transparency in process

Yes

Somewhat (transparent
after the fact but less so
to the parties)

No

Delay

No

Somewhat

Yes

Welfare standard utilized
by the agencies

MOFCOM welcomes comments on how to improve its analysis
and transparency. 4 1 Practitioner respondents credited significant outreach on the part of competition authorities from the
West, academic exchanges and private sector initiatives in
making MOFCOM feel more comfortable with comments and
concerns by stakeholders. Most practitioners note MOFCOM's
process of learning from these competition authorities as the
most positive development in Chinese antitrust. A small minority of practitioners felt that things had not improved and
pointed to specific deals of theirs or others (lawyers talk to
each other about deals) as examples where they felt that
MOFCOM's development was more uneven.
Because of the newness of the Chinese merger control system, there have not been enough data points for parties to
have "bad" mergers stop themselves. That is, there has not
been enough time for something akin to the Priest-Klein hypothesis4 2 to have been established such that parties could
even have a sense of the "sure things" that should be settled
41. Id.
42. The Priest-Klein hypothesis establishes a model describing the relationship between disputes that settle and those that proceed to litigation.
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 13J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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with the antitrust authority, and which deals may be close on
the margins. 3
With antitrust mergers, the decision-maker can block a
merger, settle on the details of a merger, force a merger to be
withdrawn or fix-it-first. The Chinese merger control process,
however, is still emerging. There are no court decisions to date
that review MOFCOM's enforcement actions.44 Chinese
merger control sometimes appears to be driven by policy
choices similar to those in Europe and the U.S., but at other
times, it exhibits a distinctively Chinese flavor.
A.

IndustrialPolicy

Industrial policy lacks an agreed upon definition.45 For
some it is government facilitated creation of structural
changes in the economy."6 For others it is to promote outcomes in particular sectors of the economy."7 These goals
often contrast with those of antitrust economics and antitrust
policy more broadly." 8Within the classification of "non-economic" goals of antitrust, a number of factors account for such
goals in merger review. Some of this is due to particular language in the enacting legislation that provides for multiple
and sometimes competing goals." These goals may create a
path dependency in case law regarding the implementation of
merger law. Moreover, even if the statute is silent or has some
43. Id.
44. For a discussion on the U.S. merger process and appeal and case law,
see PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 9 (3d ed. 2006). For a discussion on E.U. merger control procedures and appeal, seeJohn Boyce and
Claire Jeffs, Chapter 8: Merger Control, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF COMPETITION (Vivien Rose & David Bailey eds., Oxford University Press, 7th ed.
2013).
45. Howard Pack & Kamal Saggi, Is There a Case for IndustrialPolicy? A
Critical Survey, 21 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 268 (2006).
46. See, e.g., Thomas A. Pugel, Japan'sIndustrialPolicy: Instruments, Trends,
and Effects, 8 J. ComP. ECON. 420 (1984).
47. D. Daniel Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regulation, in THE GLOBAL
LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAw (loannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012);
Damien M.B. Gerard, A Global Perspective on State Action, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW (loannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012).
48. Id.
49. Competing goals of the AML can be found in various sections - Industrial policy (Art. 1), consumer welfare (Art. 27) and total welfare (Art. 28).
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sort of efficiency justification, the case law may reflect some
non- economic approaches rather than agency thinking based
upon industrial organization economics. 50
Merger case law of the past twenty years in the United
States is unambiguously based on economic analysis. It tends
to focus on consumer welfare as the basis for determining
whether a merger is anti-competitive, although ambiguity remains as to the welfare standard for efficiencies. 5 ' Empirical
work suggests that overt non-antitrust economics based politics
has, for the most part, become a non-issue in U.S. merger enforcement in recent decades.5 2 Earlier work of U.S. merger
control that examined the 1980s suggested that there were
non-economic factors at play in merger control.53 The recommendations of economists carried less weight than those of the
lawyers during this earlier period.5 4
The goals of European merger control, at the level of the
Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission (DG Competition), also tend to focus on consumer
welfare and decisions relating to efficiencies in mergers note
the importance of pass through to consumers.5 5 The classic
formulation of European court decisions remains explicit that
there are multiple goals for antitrust, including ones not based
on antitrust economics goals.5 6 Yet, overt politics play a signifi50. For example, agencies in the United States still cite to cases such as
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and United States v. Philadelphia NationalBank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), as good case law when they want
to block a merger. Agencies continue to cite these cases because the case law
is favorable to such an outcome even though the economic understanding
of those cases is retrograde by current economic thinking.
51. See Blair & Sokol, Rule of Reason, supra note 13. There is some ambiguity if the U.S. merger system is in fact consumer welfare or a mix of total
welfare and consumer welfare with regard to efficiencies, but Kolasky and
Dick argue that the system is a mix between the two. See William J. Kolasky &
Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003).
52. Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush, supra note 16, at 12.

53. Coate, Political Control, supra note 16, at 17.
54. Id. at 12.
55. How seriously efficiencies and economic analysis overall are used in
Europe is debatable. See Lars-Hendrick R611er, Challenges in EU Competition
Policy, 38 EMPRucIAL 287 (2011), available at http://link.springer.com/article
/10.1007%2Fsl0663-010-9164-x/fulltext.html.
56. DAMIEN GERADIN ET AL., EU COMPETITION LAW AN) EcONOMics 25
(2012).
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cantly smaller role now than in European merger analysis than
in earlier eras.57 Some of the underlying reasons appear similar to those seen in the U.S., such as the move to a greater
"effects" based analysis that relies more heavily on economics,
and the institutionalization of economic analysis within DG
Competition.5 8
In contrast to the United States and Europe, the AML is
not clear in practice as to the welfare standard that it employs
in merger analysis. A difference in welfare standard may particularly matter in the context of efficiencies. 5 9 One could read
that total welfare is the standard given that Article 1 of the
AML provides efficiency as a goal of the AML. However, the
total welfare standard of Article 1 is in tension with the consumer welfare standard articulated in AML Article 28. Shan et
al. suggest that from the published decisions of the first seven
challenged mergers, what has emerged is a focus on consumer
welfare.6o
A clear goal for mergers reviewed under the AML would
increase certainty in business planning regarding merger filings made in China. According to the survey respondents, Chinese merger review lacks the intellectual foundations of U.S.
or E.U. industrial organization economics as the driver of
merger control. This is partly a function of what practitioners
view as a part of a larger Chinese bureaucracy that runs
MOFCOM with the mindset of a unit of a centrally planned
government than that of antitrust enforcers within the West.
All of the survey respondents felt that Chinese antitrust law is
more concerned with industrial policy concerns than U.S. antitrust law is. A number of respondents (all American) felt that
the U.S. system was unique, and that the Chinese system was
57. Aktas et al., supra note 17; Mats A. Bergman et al., Comparing Merger

Policies in the European Union and the United States, 36 REV.
(2010).

58.

INDUS. ORG.

305

ULRICH SCHWALBE & DANIEL ZIMMER, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EURO402 (2009); Bergman et al., supra note 57; Tomaso
Duso et al., An EmpiricalAssessment of the 2004 EU MergerPolicy Reform (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fOr Sozialforschung [WZB] [Social Science Research
Center Berlin], Discussion Paper No. SSRN WZB Discussion Paper SP II
2010-16, (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
PEAN MERGER CONTROL

abstractid=1721412.
59. Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards,supra note 4.

60. Shan et al., supra note 3, at 51.
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merely a difference in degree from the European and other
antitrust systems.
Surprisingly, a significant majority of European respondents also found that Chinese antitrust more closely resembled that of Europe in the sense of political factors playing a
role in merger control. When U.S. practitioners mentioned
the European comparison, it was nearly universally used as a
pejorative comparison. U.S. practitioners tended to find that
European antitrust for mergers and other conduct is less economically based than U.S. antitrust, more suspicious of concentrated economic power, and more prone to industrial policy influences like protection of competitors or the creation of
European champions. Europeans to a lesser extent viewed this
pejoratively - some merely accepted it as reality and others
embraced the multiple and sometimes conflicting goals of European competition law.
For a number of the European lawyers, the fundamental
experience in China is similar although the context is different and the system is new. The similarities include a more legalistic analysis and approach to arguments than in the U.S.,
where the economists play a secondary (although increasing)
role relative to agency lawyers. 6 ' There is also a much stronger
concern about effects on competitors in China and Europe
than in the United States. The concern with competitors is a
function of the legal basis for the law and the larger political
economy issues in which antitrust economics based competition policy is not the sole focus of antitrust. Instead antitrust
economics welfare standards must be balanced with other factors such as the growth of the internal market in Europe or
the growth of an export based economy in China.
The identification by practitioners of a divergence between the U.S. and European approaches to antitrust is in line
with the literature that compares the use of antitrust economics in Europe and the U.S. 62 It also conforms with the less frequent use of economic analysis in European antitrust law. 63
However, recent literature shows that the gap between the
61. Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 4, at 2510.
62. Bergman, supra note 57; James C. Cooper et al., VerticalAntitrust Policy
as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORc. 639, 661 (2005).
63. Damien J. Neven, Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe, 21
ECON. PoL'Y 741 (2006).
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United States and Europe may be shrinking. 64 In China, according to survey respondents, the gap between Western and
Chinese approaches remains significant, even if MOFCOM in
a relative sense has improved considerably within the past five
years. Practitioners brought up differences particularly in the
conditionally approved cases - those cases where differences
in approaches would matter the most. In these cases, antitrust
economic analysis plays a minor role relative to the same or
similar mergers in Europe or the United States.
Even though there are some tensions and some dissimilarities with antitrust as conducted in the West under the AML,
practitioners commented about many similarities as well. Most
filings (assuming the facts and analyses as presented in the interviews are true) in China would have been analyzed the same
in terms of the analysis as in the United States or Europe. This
is true for the "plain vanilla" filings that are required based on
reporting thresholds but for which there are no competition
concerns.
Some practitioners surveyed argue that in their deals
MOFCOM tends to veer more toward a total welfare merger
analysis than consumer welfare analysis.6 5 It may be that since
antitrust economics is not always the basis for analysis, the universe of deals in which an antitrust economics welfare standard
is used is small. The welfare standard is clearest in the published decisions, where the standard articulated seems to be
primarily consumer welfare. Survey respondents suggested
that in practice many of the mergers would be approved under
either a total welfare or consumer welfare standard. Where the
two diverge, practitioners did not have a sense if MOFCOM
understood that there was a divergence.6 6
If framing MOFCOM decision-making within antitrust economics welfare standards seems to be an imprecise description, something else drives Chinese merger control. All practitioners mentioned that industrial policy is the basis for Chinese merger control.
"Industrial policy" can be subdivided into three themes.
These are: (1) protectionism, (2) bad analysis that draws upon
64. Florian Szacs, Investigating TransatlanticMerger Policy Convergence, 30
INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 654 (2012).

65. Practitioner interview responses.
66. Id.
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European legal standards and methodologies that are perceived to be less consumer welfare driven than U.S. antitrust
(with a potential implication of fewer correct outcomes and
over-deterrence), and (3) analysis that seems less correct in
outcome because of MOFCOM capacity constraints (accidental industrial policy). These constraints are present because
MOFCOM case handlers and supervisors are merely getting up
to speed on how merger control works in practice (resulting in
fewer correct decisions).
More than one of these explanations may generally be
true, or may be true for certain particular cases. The goal of
China's top leadership is not clear. It may be that antitrust is
not a significant priority. Alternatively, other priorities, such as
industrial policy, might frame the goals of China's leaders.
Those goals are factored in by the various agencies involved in
Chinese antitrust.
If the total welfare standard is adopted, then one could
argue that a logical implication is that foreign firms should be
treated differently. Conceptually, the total welfare of a given
country means the sum of consumer surplus and domestic
firms' profits."7 Under this framework, it seems that foreign
firms, whether operating in China or not, should be treated
differently because they are not a part of the China's domestic
welfare. If one adopts this view, then some of what survey respondents regard as political factors may also be construed as
a version of total welfare. That is, from a purely economic viewpoint, equal treatment of foreign firms may not be consistent
with total domestic welfare standard. If however, the consumer
welfare standard is adopted, then all firms should be treated
equally and what is clearly industrial policy would not be tolerated under a consumer welfare approach. Ultimately, the actual welfare standard employed under the AML for merger review is not always clear. Sometimes it seems based on consumer welfare but sometimes it seems that industrial policy
drives outcomes.

67. Pedro P. Barros & Luis Cabral, Merger Policy in Open Economies, 38
EUR. EcoN. REv. 1041, 1043 (1994).
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China Inc. and Mercantilism as IndustrialPolicy

Other Government Players

MOFCOM is not alone in analyzing mergers under the
Chinese merger system. Practitioner respondents explained
that every merger must be approved by an inter-agency review
that includes parts of government other than MOFCOM. The
other parts of government which provide input into merger
analysis do not use antitrust economics welfare goals, although
the cast of characters is not always clear. This leads to less predictability in the merger process. The National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology (MIIT) are the other parts of
China's government most mentioned by survey respondents as
those that have an industrial policy agenda as part of the
merger review process. However, it is not only direct government action through ministries in which the political process
plays a considerable role in merger review. Other players in
merger review include additional government ministries, and
regional or local governments. These players push for overt
political analysis of mergers that benefits Chinese competitors
and especially Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) groups. 68
2.

Trade Associations

Trade associations carry significant weight in merger review and can apply pressure.6 9 Chinese trade associations are
different from those in the West in that the government
pushes them and the trade association has many SOE members. Practitioners reported that trade associations are much
more powerful in China than in the West and much more political. Ministries will check with trade associations regarding
deal clearance. Trade associations also can be active pre-filing.
Trade associations are well organized and often speak
with a single voice for their members in ways that are not analogous to trade associations in Europe or the United States.
Oftentimes the trade association concerns sent to a government ministry are ghost-written by a company and sometimes
68. Practitioner interview responses.
69. For a discussion see Qian Hao, Trade Associations and Private Antitrust
Litigation in China 4, CPI ANTITRUSr CHRONICLE (Spring 2013).
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the MOFCOM questions asked to the merging parties are
ghost-written by the other ministry.
3.

Technology Deals

Some practitioners allege that not all concessions made to
agencies as part of the negotiation made for merger approval
are reported. Many of the reported concessions seem to involve the transfer of technology from Western to Chinese
firms. Technology deals in particular involve closer scrutiny
because of the industrial policy considerations. Practitioners
report that deals often need to be structured so that Chinese
firms will benefit from Western technology and know-how
divestitures as a condition of deal approval or fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments on terms that
seem overly generous as part of the proposed remedy suggested by the merging parties. 70
The nature of technology transfer guides many Chinese
merger decisions. If there is an acquisition of a Chinese firm
by a Western firm, there is particular concern about the impact of the acquisition on China's ability to compete within
the specific market. Mergers that would have otherwise
presented competition problems may have been cleared because the mergers allowed for technology transfer to Chinese
companies, and MOFCOM may have viewed these transfers as
helping the growth of the Chinese economy and are perceived
by Western practitioners to be approved for that reason.7 1
Technology deals in the manufacturing sector in particular receive close scrutiny.
4.

SOEs and "China Inc."

State owned enterprises constitute a significant percent of
all Chinese firms.72 SOEs also play a complicated role within
AML merger control. The applicability of the AML to Chinese
70. Practitioner interview responses.
71. The current Chinese 5 year plan emphasizes "indigenous innovation"
by China to overcome its technology gap with the West. See D. Daniel Sokol
& Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming
2014).
72. Jerry Cao et al., DisproportionalOwnership Structure and Pay-Peformance
Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 541, 542
(2011); Hong Zou & Mike B. Adams, Corporate Ownership, Equity Risk and
Returns in the People's Republic of China, 39 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 1149 (2008).
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SOEs remains unclear.73 Depending on one's reading, SOEs
may be exempt under Article 7 of the AML. Yet, some SOE
notifications have occurred, most notably the joint venture
(JV) between General Electric (China) and China Shenhua
Coal-to-Liquids and Chemicals. According to practitioners,
SOEs do not always file their mergers for review before
MOFCOM. Some merely go directly to the relevant government ministries for approval of their mergers informally
outside of the AML process. 74
Practitioners mentioned JVs between foreign firms and
SOEs are notified but only if the foreign firm insists upon it. In
the case of merger approval for JVs, aJV will be approved without a problem if one of the JV members is an SOE. Foreign to
foreign firm JVs may receive a more detailed review by
MOFCOM. An SOE to SOE JV, according to practitioners,
seems not to be notified. The subsequently published list by
MOFCOM of mergers it approved without conditions between
August 1, 2008 and September 30, 2012 supports the practitioner comments on SOEs. 75
Employment impact (i.e., reductions of worker redundancies) due to mergers within China may impact approval of a
particular transaction. This is particularly true for industries
that are seen by the Communist Party as strategic both for the
export oriented growth of politically powerful Chinese SOEs,
and for the growth of particular provinces in which the SOEs
may have significant operations. Practitioners feel that they
have learned that mergers involving "famous brands" or other
strategic industries are risky regarding merger approval. Consequently, they are not willing to advise mergers and potential
remedies to clients unless they receive significant input from
government affairs specialists, and even then feel very cautious
about being able to get the deal through on terms that make
economic sense for the merging parties.
73. See Lin & Zhao, supra note 3, at 117.

74. The release by MOFCOM of unconditional approvals (in November
[The Antilgo
2012) confirms this. See K,2
Monopoly Bureau Enhances Disclosure of Notifications of Concentration of
Undertakings] (November 15, 2012), available (in Chinese) at http://images.
mofcom.gov.cn/fldj/accessory/201211/1353031118730.pdf (revealing that
more than 90% of the cases involve foreign companies and none of the
mergers among "central SOEs" have appeared on the list since 2008).
75. Id.
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There is a push within China to develop more Chinese
global market leaders and more Global Fortune 500 firms.
The Chinese government is more broadly sympathetic towards
Chinese firms when such firms face increased competition.
This is especially the case in industries that it views as essential
to what practitioners called "China Inc." - the ability to have a
significant Chinese global player in an industry. Consequently,
the growth of current Chinese firms within a particular market
is a factor that shapes the merger review process. This is
framed in terms of existing Chinese firms in a particular market relative to non-Chinese competitors. Practitioners suggest
that this is particularly true in industries where there are significant numbers of patents. 7 6 Thus, merger control is not merely
industrial policy based on the current Chinese players but also
based upon the potential for future Chinese entry.
MOFCOM (perhaps itself or perhaps as a front for other
parts of the government) in some cases wants to understand
why there are no Chinese competitors in a given market and
asks this question to merging parties. Many practitioners perceived that the remedies imposed upon Samsung/Seagate" and
Western Digital/Hitachi8 in their conditional approvals were, in
76. The Chinese government is explicit about the need to promote "indigenous" intellectual property. See The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year
Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2006), available (in Chinese) at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
misc/2006-03/16/content_4309517.htin; State Council of the People's Republic of China, The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) (2006), available (in Chinese)
at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm. See also Sokol
& Zheng, supra note 71.
[Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement
of Decision After Anti-Monopoly Review in Regard to the Conditional Approval of the Acquisition of the Hard Disk Drive Business of Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. by Seagate Technology (2011 No. 90)] (Dec. 12, 2011),
available (in Chinese) at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201112/201
11207874274.shtmi.
E
T 4h
j [ic$ t_ t-At 9.1 t 9
'
78.
~
012~~))[Ministry
(
~f t ~
of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Announcement of Decision after Anti-Monopoly Review to Impose Restrictive Conditions on the
Approval of the Concentration of Undertakings for the Acquisition of
Hitachi Storage by Western Digital] (Mar. 2, 2012), available (in Chinese) at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201203/20120307993758.shtml.
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part, driven by industrial policy. The behavioral remedies, including the imposition of a monitor to oversee the implementation of the remedies were rather intrusive interventions. A
large number of the lawyers who followed these deals closely
believe that the real purpose of the monitor for the Chinese
government was to better understand Western businesses and
their processes in an industry in which there was no Chinese
global competitor and in which China is the world's largest
market for personal computers.
The only merger to date that MOFCOM has blocked was
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan. Practitioners surveyed almost universally
found this MOFCOM's analysis of the transaction to be deeply
problematic. The decision came under attack by the international antitrust community as an example of Chinese industrial policy taking priority over economic analysis. The deal involved the acquisition by a foreign firm of a Chinese "famous
brand." MOFCOM's decision made a number of claims. First,
it alleged that Coca-Cola's dominance in soft drinks would allow it to leverage its dominance to the market for juice.7 9 The
second claim was that with the Huiyuan acquisition, Coca Cola
would have, along with its own brand of Minute Maid, two
strong brands. The possession of two strong brands,
MOFCOM argued, would raise barriers to potential entrants in
the juice market. The third reason that MOFCOM gave is that
the merger would squeeze small competitors in the orange
juicy industry, thereby preventing them from innovating.
Many issues remained unclear from MOFCOM's decision. As a
general matter, how MOFCOM determined dominance and
the market was not clear nor was the issue of market definition.80
79. The combined market share in juice would have been approximately
20 percent post-merger.

80.

J.L- 3E

[Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Public Statement No. 22 [2009]
(Statement on the Decision to Prohibit Coca Cola Company's Acquisition on
China Huiyua Group)] (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.
cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html. Many of the repeat players
note the limits of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan.They claim that Coca-Cola did not want
to push very hard to get the deal through on the terms demanded by
MOFCOM because the value of Huiyan had declined significantly since the
time the deal was originally signed.
!,
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Survey practitioners were nearly universally disappointed
by the economic analysis employed in the case and believed
the decision to be thinly veiled protectionism.8 ' The driving
force behind blocking the deal was the acquisition of a famous
brand by a foreign firm. Most practitioners suggested that the
nature of the reasoning in Coca-Cola/Huiyuanwas emblematic
of the type of reasoning that MOFCOM needs to undertake
for politically sensitive deals. That is, MOFCOM knows the outcome that it wants to undertake (largely because of institutional constraints from other parts of China's government)
and creates a set of economic theories to back into this conclusion. 2 MOFCOM thus serves as a filter for other agencies/
ministries that have concerns about non-competition industrial policy factors.
MOFCOM faced tremendous backlash and scrutiny from
the global antitrust community as to the reasoning behind the
merger. This backlash has been seen as a blessing in disguise,
according to many practitioners. As a result of this scrutiny,
MOFCOM has become more empowered in its dealings with
other parts of government. Other parts of government are no
longer able to be so heavy handed in concessions that they ask
via MOFCOM of the merging parties. MOFCOM now requires
an economic theory of competitive effects that passes international scrutiny, even when political concerns drive the outcome of a deal.
MOFCOM increasingly craves international legitimacy in
its antitrust decision-making and seeks to be technocratic in its
outcomes. The search for legitimacy with other antitrust authorities has limits. If MOFCOM pushes too hard on a purely
antitrust economics arguments, a number of the practitioners
feel that MOFCOM will face significant pushback and find its
relative standing diminished within Chinese government.
Seen from the viewpoint of the development of the antitrust system, MOFCOM leadership may have chosen incremental change rather than radical change toward an antitrust economics based approach largely because it has skillfully pushed
81. Some scholars have taken an alternative viewpoint and suggest that
there may have been credible competition reasons to block the deal. See
Zhang & Zhang, supra note 19, at 490.
82. Responses suggest that this tends to be MOFCOM's approach in most
major deals, even those that receive approval without conditions imposed.
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the limits of its standing as much as it can, given the larger
political economic realities in China.8 3 In in many ways, this
Chinese process mirrors evolutionary changes that occurred in
the United States8 4 and Europe8 5 in their own merger control
systems.
As part of the evolution of Chinese antitrust, other parts
of government do not always trump MOFCOM's concerns.
Practitioners identified that MOFCOM sometimes fights other
agencies as to how much politics to inject and sometimes it
does not. MOFCOM's willingness to fight for economic analysis of a merger depends on which ministries are involved and
whether the merger decision will be published. Survey respondents noted that in cases in which MOFCOM is willing to expend its political capital, MOFCOM looks for analytic support
on competition concerns from the parties to raise these points
with the other ministries.
C.

IndustrialPolicy as a Variant of European Competition Law

MOFCOM itself may be more protectionist relative to the
United States as it emulates European competition law. Many
of the foreign lawyers who are part of the Chinese antitrust
community (working at the non-Chinese firms) are European
and consequently use a more European approach and cite to
European case law for examples. In terms of the assumptions
and types of arguments made in competition analysis, this
more European approach may become a norm within China. 86
Competitor complaints are a common part of European
merger analysis.8 7 China follows a stronger variation of the Eu83. Other theories may provide explanatory value. However, based on
the survey responses and the author's own analysis, the theory presented in
this paragraph seems most likely to be the correct one.

84. See William E. Kovacic, HSR at 35: The Early US Premerger Notification
Experience and its Meaningfor New Systems of Competition Law, in NEW COMPETITIONJURISDICTIONS: SHAPING POLICIES AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS 9 (Richard
Whish & Christopher Townley eds., 2012) [hereinafter HSR at 351.
85. Cf Mats Bergman et al., An EconometricAnalysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions, 23 INT'LJ. INoUS. ORG. 717 (2005).
86. Technically, only Chinese law firms can attend meetings with
MOFCOM. Nevertheless, non-Chinese law firms are actively involved in Chinese merger control.
87. Historical factors and path dependency explain the greater orientation toward industrial policy of EC merger control. The core of European
competition law was to further market integration over other factors such as
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ropean model. In Chinese merger control, competitor and
customer complaints are taken more seriously than in the
United States and particularly so if it is a Chinese competitor
and again particularly so if the Chinese competitor is an SOE.
There is a concern to protect consumers when the manufacturers are foreign, but protection of consumers seems to matter less when the competitors are Chinese firms.
Adding to the European analogy is the smaller role that
economists play relative to lawyers in both Europe and China.
As economists played a minor role in merger enforcement in
Europe, this meant that decisions made by the Commission to
challenge mergers may have lacked a rigorous economicjustification. This too has changed due to the institutionalization
of greater economic analysis and an economics staff not
subordinate to lawyers as well as a series of cases that reversed
Commission challenges based upon insufficient economic
analysis. 8 8 We see a similar trend in China regarding a transition towards more economic analysis.
The organizational structure of economists may impact
the nature of the use of economics within the merger process
and how economics based merger control will be.8" In some
ways, the starting point for MOFCOM's institutional design,
specifically the organization of its merger team, is better than
Europe's was in 1989 for merger control. MOFCOM already
has a standalone economics group. Moreover, the quality of
Chinese economists has improved both among universities
and at MOFCOM. The same is true among the lawyers with a
number of competition law centers affiliated with universities
in Beijing and Shanghai. 0
efficiency.

DAVID

J.

GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY

37-38 (1998). This meant that efficiency
played a lesser role in the original formulation of European competition law.
In the early years of the merger regime these overt political factors were
more central to European merger policy than is the case today. Aktas et al.,
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS

Market Reactions, supra note 17.

88.

FRANCESCO RUSSO ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION DECISIONS ON COM-

PETITION:

CASES

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK

ANTITRUST AND

MERGER

113-97 (2010).

89. Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of OrganizingEconomists, 76
L.J. 569 (2009); Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 4.

ANTI-

TRUST

90. Competition law centers in China include those of Renmin, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, UIBE and ShanghaiJiao Tong universities.
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The learning curve for MOFCOM in terms of the application of economic analysis has been significant in the first four
years. The first two decisions by MOFCOM (InBev/AnheuserBusch and Coca-Cola/Huiyuan)did not define the relevant market, although subsequent decisions have. MOFCOM has also
moved beyond structural presumptions. A number of the decisions and discussions with MOFCOM staff include unilateral
and coordinated effects. Unpublished decisions also grapple
with these issues. Practitioners in particular focused on improvements in MOFCOM's unilateral effects analysis.
These relative advances in the past four years should not
obscure significant MOFCOM capacity constraints with regard
to economic analysis. MOFCOM officials and staff may be familiar with basic terminology of certain antitrust merger concepts but in practice seem to struggle with their application.
While some practitioners believe that MOFCOM has improved
significantly over a short period of time, others find that the
overall quality of merger enforcement has not changed
enough. This is largely because of institutional limits of
MOFCOM within the Chinese government and the high turnover of case handlers that seems to lead to significant delay in
the merger process as well as significant relearning by overworked case handlers.
D.

Agency Inexperience

Most practitioners noted that MOFCOM's early economic
analysis was weak. However, they also note that increasingly
MOFCOM looks beyond market shares to bidding behavior
and entry. One reason why economists in China may not be
treated in the same regard as in Europe or the United States is
that traditional notions of industrial organization/antitrust economics are less relevant than in the West, as in China the
market is not the basis of the economy. Instead, the managed
economy creates a different set of assumptions about the robustness of competition, entry barriers, financing and other
factors that Western economists and lawyers take for granted.
Most practitioners cautioned that one cannot use sophisticated economic approaches applied in the West for Chinese
merger control. One function of the lack of sophisticated economic analysis is that many law firms often do not prepare economic expert reports because of the fear that such reports
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would only draw unneeded scrutiny to deals without significant concerns or alternatively would confuse MOFCOM staff.
Economists are used infrequently and only strategically by the
parties, often based on the advice of Chinese law firms. When
economists are used, they tend to be used for market definition or competitive effects analysis. According to a number of
the survey respondents, MOFCOM seems to have confronted
problems in terms of understanding efficiencies arguments.
A number of practitioners note that sometimes MOFCOM
wants the merging parties to provide the economic analysis
done in other jurisdictions even if the economic analysis is
based upon a national (or regional) market and not directly
applicable to China. However, many practitioners find that
MOFCOM's economic analysis has improved overall.
MOFCOM has hired outside economists for some transactions
and this has helped bring increased sophistication to those
transactions and to subsequent transactions in which
MOFCOM staff exclusively work on the deals.
E.

Transparency

Merger transparency is a significant concern to the global
antitrust community. It is for this reason that the first work
product of the ICN Mergers Working Group was a set of Recommended Practices for antitrust authorities that included a
goal of increased transparency.9 1 Issues of transparency seem
to be particularly acute with new merger systems. 9 2 In the Chinese context, more than half of all practitioners surveyed without any prompting used the term "black box" to describe the
merger review process. Nearly all respondents (including
those who were prompted) agreed that "black box" is an accurate description. This was true regardless of whether the practitioner in question had significant regular merger work in
China or was just an episodic player. Practitioners revealed a
rather Byzantine structure of merger approval with multiple
gatekeepers both within MOFCOM and with other agencies
91.
MENDE)

INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PRACTICES

FOR

MERGER

NOTIFICATION

AND

REVIEW

ICN

RECOM-

PROCEDURES

(Apr. 2005), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
uploads/library/doc324.pdf.
92. See HSR at 35, supra note 84.
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that was not particularly transparent nor always easily predictable. 3
Practitioners complained that sometimes it is difficult to
understand what is happening procedurally in Chinese transactions. According to many survey respondents, there are information requests without explanations of why the information is relevant to the specific transaction. The rationale for
such unrelated questions seems to be that MOFCOM is trying
to learn about particular industries. In other cases, practitioners believe that it is other ministries and Chinese companies
trying to better understand how to compete as a number of
practitioners raised anecdotes that suggested breaches of confidentiality of the data submitted. Practitioners explained that
follow up questions from MOFCOM and the information that
they conveyed was not always clear. Further, practitioners did
not feel that MOFCOM was particularly forthcoming about
where in the process the concern emerged and why there was
such a significant delay in relaying the concern. 4
Overall, practitioners were unified in the view that
MOFCOM does not always do an effective job of expressing
why other ministries have concerns, which makes some practitioners believe that the problem lies with MOFCOM's understanding (or lack thereof). The experience of some practitioners has been that economic arguments go nowhere with
MOFCOM and MOFCOM does not explain what the problem
holding up a deal may be. However, other government ministries are primarily to blame for the length of the hold-up.
Some practitioners did not always understand this distinction
as to what motivates delay, as these practitioners only interact
with MOFCOM and not other parts of China's government.
The repeat players tended to understand this distinction far
more readily than episodic players. It was the repeat players
who were the most sympathetic to MOFCOM's institutional
design constraints that allowed for non-political factors to
emerge from other agencies under which MOFCOM must operate.
Many jurisdictions publish merger guidelines to explain
the process and methodology used to evaluate mergers, and to
93. Predictability allows for legal certainty as to the merger process and
to possible outcomes.
94. Practitioner interview responses.
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increase transparency.9 5 In 2011, MOFCOM promulgated Interim Provisions on Assessment of Competitive Impact of Concentrations of Business Operators.While the methodology in the guide-

lines looks similar to that of other jurisdictions, practitioners
explained that these Interim Provisions were too brief to provide meaningful guidance on plotting a legal strategy relative
to guidelines in other jurisdictions. Moreover, practitioners
were concerned that the guidelines offered a false structure to
Chinese merger control. They noted that true merger guidelines in China would have explained that antitrust methodology only matters in the subset of cases in which political factors
do not play a role and that more useful merger guidelines
would have explained when and under what circumstances
politics trump antitrust economic analysis as part of merger
control.
An additional form of transparency is to publish merger
decisions. Under the AML, MOFCOM is required to publish
decisions that block a merger or attach conditions to a
merger. 6 Practitioners suggest that there is a subset of conditional approvals that has never been published. In some jurisdictions, important mergers are approved without conditions.
However, in such cases the antitrust authority still provides a
form of closing statement to create transparency in the decision-making process, and to discuss the analysis the agency followed in allowing the merger.
MOFCOM does not provide details about deals that were
approved without any conditions. Some of these deals would
have been pro-forma approvals. Others, however, are ones in
which there might be some competition concern and the lack
of transparency for such approvals creates a selection bias for
papers that examine only those deals that have been conditionally approved or blocked and for which MOFCOM has
provided a statement.
The lack of published decisions suggests that MOFCOM,
to some degree, prefers to operate within the aforementioned
"black box." Though on its face this suggests a willful lack of
transparency, MOFCOM may have some good reasons for
some obfuscation. The policy of limiting transparency is no
95. Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to
Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUsT L.J. 49 (2010).

96. AML, supra note 2, at ch. 4, art. 30.
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different than the policy choices of more mature merger regimes. Agencies prefer to have discretion and thus prefer not
to be locked in to written policies. Too much transparency creates a roadmap for evasion and constrains MOFCOM from future enforcement actions based on past decisions, when past
decisions may be less well developed than MOFCOM's current
and future decisions. Lack of transparency may be a function
of uncertainty of how to handle a case and a concern that too
much transparency might open MOFCOM to additional criticism both domestically and internationally. Practitioners mentioned that sometimes MOFCOM moves slowly to see how
other jurisdictions will handle the deal.
Transparency can increase faith of practitioners in the
merger process because it may increase accountability and reduce personal bias. However, the side effect of transparency is
that it may lay out a roadmap for the strategic use of antitrust
by competitors.9 7 When asked, many practitioners mentioned
that they strategically use merger control in Europe to attempt
to "blow up" deals of competitors. They also admitted to making competitor complaints in the United States or Europe.
The purpose of such complaints is to increase the time of an
investigation (a second request or phase 2 investigation, respectively), and to increase the financing and legal costs of the
merging parties. In some settings, competitor complaints also
lead to additional deal concessions by the merging parties or
possibly blocking of the deal. Overwhelmingly, the same practitioners said that they have been contemplating doing the
same in China once the system becomes more transparent for
them to understand how best to utilize such a strategy.
Presently, the lack of transparency into the merger control process makes it more difficult to advise clients as to timing and issues that might emerge and how to best handle
problems expeditiously and effectively when they do arise.
This set of problems may impact how firms will behave in the
future" because of the uncertainty at MOFCOM.
97. R. Preston McAfee, Transparency and Antitrust Policy (Yahoo! Research, Working Paper Sept. 25, 2009); see also D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic
Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. Cu. L.
REv. 689, 689 (2012) (discussing the strategic use of antitrust in the litigation
setting).
98. Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Dynamic Merger Review, 118 J.
POL. ECON. 1200 (2010).
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F. Delay
Delay can create considerable problems for antitrust practitioners (i.e. uncertainty as to whether or not the deal can
close within the existing financing window). Customers may be
less willing to enter into new agreements with the target firm
before a deal closes and the target may lose important managers and staff because deal uncertainty creates job uncertainty.
Practitioners mentioned that delay is particularly a problem in China. Delay in merger control is a function of a number of different factors. MOFCOM is short staffed. The reporting threshold for mergers that need to be notified is low,
which exacerbates the staffing problem. This adds to the delay
as MOFCOM seems to be overwhelmed with the number of
filings and information.
Delays by MOFCOM staff are not the most significant part
of merger delays. The most important finding regarding delay
has to do with the direct intervention of other parts of government within MOFCOM's merger review process. Every merger
goes through interagency review, which explains why mergers
take so long to gain clearance. Other government ministries
need to sign off on merger approval for a merger to be
cleared. Many months can go by in terms of negotiations with
MOFCOM and these other parts of governments (sometimes
with the knowledge of the merging parties but not always according to practitioners).
These other parts of government can have significant influence in putting certain conditions on the merger approval
and may ask questions and force concessions of the merging
parties that have nothing to do with antitrust concerns of competitive effects of the merger. As a result of the interventions
of other parts of government, the merging parties need time
to prepare responses (assuming that the concerns get relayed
back in a clear manner) to address these issues. A number of
practitioners noted that because these concerns are always
filtered back through Chinese counsel and MOFCOM, it is not
always clear how responsive the merging parties' additional
data submissions are.
Overall, practitioners seem to believe that the trend has
been one of less delay in merger review. One reason for the
reduction of delay is that MOFCOM has learned in a short
time frame to be more effective, with more expedited reviews
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of deals that raise no antitrust or political concerns. From the
procedural delay side, more deals seem to be being cleared in
early phase II review. Another factor that has reduced delay is
that MOFCOM seems to be responding to international pressure that highlights delay in the merger control process.
Nevertheless, MOFCOM itself is not immune from issues
that cause delay. The relative youth of the Chinese antitrust
system is something that many practitioners noted leads to delays. MOFCOM case handler turnover is high which means
that staff tends to ask many unnecessary questions to learn
about both the merger review process and particular industries. One factor that leads to delays is the variability of the
expertise of the MOFCOM case handler assigned to the specific deal. Many new case handlers receive on the job training
with deals that should be simple. Yet, because of the lack of
expertise of the case handler, the merger process takes longer.
Further, to appear to conform to international best practices,
MOFCOM has a liberal view of when a filing is "accepted" as
filed. Essentially, there is a pre-Phase I phase of filing, which is
used merely to get the filing in order, a Phase I filing and a
more in-depth Phase II investigation.
The overwhelming sense of the practitioner community is
that the MOFCOM lawyers are less well versed in economics
than their agency counterparts in other global jurisdictions.
However, many of the practitioners noted that the MOFCOM
lawyers seem to be trying very hard to learn economic concepts and are at least as familiar with the particular economic
terms even if the nuance of some of those terms does not seem
clear to them.
There are also factors exogenous to MOFCOM and the
institutional structure of Chinese merger control that lead to
delays. Chinese legal counsel do not always articulate clearly to
Western legal counsel and the merging parties what the problem is and how to solve it. This leads to delay and frustration
on the part of the merging parties and their non-Chinese lawyers. It also makes many outside law firms and merging parties
more reactive than proactive in moving along a deal through
the merger process. Most foreign law firms presented a mixed
view of their Chinese law firm counsel. They suggested that
Chinese law firms were not particularly sophisticated as compared to their home jurisdiction, do not ask the right questions and do not question issues that MOFCOM raises. A num-
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her of Western firms complained that the Chinese law firms
were not "advocates" in the more Western sense for their clients. Some practitioners went so far as to express concern that
their Chinese law firms have dual loyalties to them as well as to
the Chinese government. This concern may reflect different
cultural norms, the newness of the merger process, and a lack
of understanding on the part of Western firms as much as a
problem of Chinese counsel.
V.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This paper surveyed nearly all of the Chambers-ranked
non-PRC-based law firms about their observations to determine the extent of the political (non-economic) forces at play
in merger control. Unlike in mature Western antitrust systems,
in China, political factors compete with antitrust economic factors in merger control. A few insights from that study show
how political Chinese merger control can be. The most important finding has to do with the direct intervention of other
parts of government within MOFCOM's merger review process
(see the discussion supra on industrial policy). Other government ministries need to sign off on merger approval. Many
months can go by in terms of negotiations with MOFCOM and
these other parts of governments (sometimes with the knowledge of the merging parties but not always). These other parts
of government can have significant influence in putting certain conditions on the merger approval not based on antitrust
economics and may require concessions by the merging parties that have nothing to do with competitive effects.
One important finding is the importance of third party
competitor complaints in merger analysis. If there is a Chinese
company, particularly an SOE, which competes within the
same relevant market or may at some point merely think of
entering the market, the merger notification receives significantly more scrutiny, particularly when intellectual property is
an issue in the merger. This is the case even if the competitive
effects are negligible such that in other merger systems the
deal would fall within a presumptive safe harbor because the
market shares of the merging parties might be under 25 percent. As a result of these pressures, MOFCOM's decisions at
times have been attempts to frame political concerns within
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the language of economic analysis, even when the economic
analysis undertaken is more rudimentary than what one might
find in Western Europe or North America.
The next decade will provide more data for in depth analysis of the Chinese merger system. In the meantime, data collection remains a significant problem. This study overcomes
some of the traditional data problems to offer a positive assessment of the current state of the emerging Chinese antitrust
merger regime and offer a case study of issues common to
many new and emerging competition authorities.
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